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Sex Panic and the Welfare State
BENJAMIN SHEPARD

California State University Long Beach

2006 marked the tenth anniversary of the PersonalResponsibility
and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct. The 1996 law was the
culmination of decades of erosion in backing for basic provisions
of the U.S. social safety net. The following reviews the political
campaign that undermined thefoundationfor this vital component
of the New Deal/GreatSociety income supports. A series of panics
diminished approvalfor the welfare state, leading to the 1996
"reform." Panicdiscourseincreasinglyaccompanies policy debate.
Examples of anti welfare, antioutsiderpanicdiscoursesareexplored.
Keywords: sex panic, reform, social safety net, welfare state,
public policy, public debate, moral panic

February 2 5 th, 2004, President Bush proclaimed gay marriage was a threat to "the most fundamental institution of
civilization," (Sandalow, 2004). With this declaration, public
concern over war and budget deficits receded as a sex panic
over gay marriage and abortion shifted the terms of public
debate. Faced with a 'threat' to a "fundamental institution of
civilization," the electorate awarded Bush a second term. And
he claimed a mandate to dismantle core foundations of the
U.S. welfare state (Krugman, 2005).
2004 was not the first time a sex panic had struck fear into
U.S. electorate, thus undermining support for public welfare
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provisions. Panic has long accompanied shifts in the ways
public policy enters and exits public life. In this, the tenth
year since the passage of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, better known
as 'welfare reform', it is useful to consider the generationlong political campaign that undermined public backing for
this and other safety net provisions. While many consider the
1996 law a success, others describe it as regressive and punitive (Abramovitz, 2000). Explanations vary as to when Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) first lost support.
Some suggest that the racialization of welfare is the primary
reason for the loss of confidence in the program (Hancock,
2004; Schram et al, 2003). Others suggest that since 90 percent
of the program's recipients are women, sexism is a primary
cause for the program's lack of popularity (Abramovitz, 2005,
p. 387). This essay posits that a series sex and moral panics, encompassing these themes, undermined support for the welfare
state, leading to the 1996 "reform."
Paralleling the demise of the welfare state, there has been
a proliferation of sex and moral panics (Cohen, 1972/2002;
Crimp et al, 1998; Duggan, 1995; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994;
Hall et al, 1978; Thompson, 1998). Studies of the discursive contours of moral panics highlight the ideological quandaries at
the center of thirty years of debate over social welfare policy. A
number of recent comparative studies of current welfare policies (Sidell, 1998, p. 26-27; Wagner, 1997a, p. 42-48) have specifically located conditions of moral panic within policy debates
over public assistance and services for the poor. Other studies
(Abramovitz, 1996, 2000; Piven and Cloward, 1993) consider
the increase in policies aimed at the moral regulation of the
personal and sexual lives of those on public assistance. These
works consider the backlashes over public sexuality and the
ensuing social controls which usually follow sex panics.
At their core, studies of sex and moral panics investigate
social hierarchies. These studies become inquiries into social
tensions, ambiguities, and fears, as themes of gender, race,
crime, youth, immigration status, and social upheaval are projected onto highly charged acts including public sex, drug use,
non-monogamy, birth control, and teenage pregnancy. These
symbolic acts-and the calls for their suppression--can be
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used to assess shifts in social and economic life. For scholars
of panic, discourses of fear typically inspire pessimism, which
result in the allocation of resources to secure a worthy 'us'
from fear of an 'impure' them (Altheide, 2002; Glassner, 1999;
Morone, 2003).
"Sex panics, witchhunts, and red scares are staples of
American history," Lisa Duggan (1995) elaborates. "While
often promoted by relatively powerless but vocal minorities
hostile to cultural difference, they have been enthusiastically
taken up by powerful groups in an effort to impose rigid orthodoxy on the majority" (p. 75). In the case of the panics over
the welfare state, "moral reform" functions as a trope for the
neglect of substantive social problems related to income inequality, race, and sexism.
The concept of sex panic builds on the idea of moral panic
first coined within British sociology and cultural studies described by sociologist Stanley Cohen (1972/2002). The term
builds on themes from sociology of deviance, collective behavior, social problems, structuralism, and critical theory. It conceptualized a process in which cultural institutions draw perimeters around deviance to generate hysteria. Here outsiders
are viewed as social threats, and a spiral of condemnation from
interest groups, including politicians, the media, and police
follows. For Cohen, who analyzed British youth subcultures
in the 1960s, the moral panic scapegoat becomes a "folk devil"
onto whom cultural anxieties can be projected. In the case of
the welfare state, the folk devil in question has consistently
been the promiscuous "welfare queen" who has transgressed
community norms. Sociologist Jeffrey Weeks (1985) concisely
describes the cycle:
The mechanics of a moral panic are well known: the
definition of a threat in a youthful event (a youthful
'riot', a sexual scandal); the stereotyping of the main
characters in the mass media as particular species
of monsters (the prostitute as 'fallen woman', the
pedophile as 'child molester'); a spiraling escalation of
the perceived threat, leading to a taking up of absolutist
positions and the manning of moral barricades; the
emergence of an imaginary solution; a symbolic court
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action; followed by the subsidence of the anxiety, with
its victims left to endure the new proscription, social
climate and legal penalties (1985, p. 45).

As theorists grappled with public policies aimed at alleviating social problems such as AIDS, homelessness, and poverty,
dynamics of moral panic overlapped with debates about the
urban "underclass." Here a distinct panic discourse took
shape. Political scientist James Morone (2003) suggests panic
discourse involves a familiar schema. In times of social flux,
interest groups: 1) stir a moral frenzy; 2) identify a demon; 3)
mobilize interests; and 4) increase police powers.
Goode & Ben Yehuda (1994) have outlined five specific
indicators of collective behavior that occurs during such episodes. These include: volatility, hostility, measurable concern,
consensus and disproportionality. Panics over the welfare state
share many of these historic discursive contours. A racialized
view of women on welfare combined with anxiety about shifts
in the nuclear family contributed to the volatility witnessed
within debate involving 'doing something about welfare.'
Fear about the social threat presented by outsiders resulted in
hostility. Most panics involve unsanctioned activities or cultural groupings that threaten the status quo or the traditional
family. This helps explain the rise of panics around teenage
pregnancy (Luker, 1996; Sidell, 1998). Shifting sexual mores
have inspired measurable concern (McClaren, 1999; Thompson,
1998). Similar panics involve questions about the control of
behaviors believed to lead to disease (Wagner, 1997a). This is
where panics over sex and drug use accompany public policies
ranging from methadone maintenance to HIV, prevention, and
service provision for undocumented immigrants. Here, panic
over the use of public services resulted in a consensus about the
need to do something to address the problem (Altheide, 2002).
Concern about welfare could be witnessed in poll after poll
by the 1990's. And while anxiety disproportionatelyexpanded
beyond proportion of the actual threat, the signs of collective
behavior which propelled the welfare panic took a life of their
own.
Each marker of panic has significance as a cultural symbol.
French structuralist philosopher Michel Foucault described the
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social, professional, and linguistic construction of such symbols
as elements within "discourses." By discourse, he referred to a
linkage of symbolic representations to a series of social actions
and actors. Their interaction produces social meanings embodied by cultural "objects," including those that become the subjects of moral panics (Zukin, 1995). A theoretical approach to
studying moral panics is to analyze "discourses" that regulate
and demarcate hierarchies of what is normal or natural, neutral
or immoral, worthy or unworthy (Thompson, 1998: 72).
In a study of the birth of the modem prison, Foucault
asserts, "A corpus of knowledge, techniques, 'scientific' discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of
power to punish" (1977, p. 23). This framework assumes that
tools of professional knowledge, diagnosis, and assessment influence the ways actors are rendered sane and insane, healthy
and unhealthy, normal and abnormal, worthy and unworthy.
These forms of what Foucault called 'bio-power' help establish
parameters of the normal, while pathologizing otherness. Here
government programs, from police to social services, use biopower to regulate and control social interactions. Along the
way, desires are regulated, described, punished, organized,
and sanctioned by dominant social, economic, and cultural
discourses (Warner 1993, p. xxv-viii; Floersch, 2000).
Kenneth Thompson notes that many studies of sex and
moral panics "focus on processes of representation and on
mapping the discourses which the mass media use to construct
a view of events which gives rise to a sense of increasing risk
and possibly moral panics, particularly about sexuality" (1998,
p.72). Most sociological analyses of moral panics focus on discourses organized by stakeholders to frame arguments about
social issues. Thompson suggests that discourses over worthy
vs. unworthy sexuality address a central concern of modem
life: the besieged nuclear family. "Familial ideology is obliged
to fight a continual rear guard action in order to disavow the
social and sexual diversification of a culture which can never
be adequately pictured in the traditional guise of the family
of cohabitating parents and children," (1998, p. 72-73). Such
discourses provide the raw evidence of the panics and their
impacts (Cohen, 2002, p. viii). Here social interactions involving dominant and dominated social groups are impacted by an
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ongoing process of social and cultural demonization (Zukin,
1995).
Panics over public welfare involve four key themes: laziness, drugs, violence, and, of course, sex (Morone, 2003: 17).
What emerges within such cases is a series of competing narratives and intersecting discourses that frequent discussions
of public sexuality. On the one hand, social movements aim
at reducing inequality, while increasing social mobility; on
the other, countervailing forces call for regulation and social
controls, which halt the advances of social outsiders into fuller
democratic participation (Fraser 1989). The following examines four such welfare panics: the Newburgh panic of 1961;
the Goldwater race panics; the teenage pregnancy panics; and,
the panics over public sexuality which raged throughout the
'Welfare Reform' debates in the mid 1990s.
Moral panics overlap with countless chapters of U.S.
history. Even the Witch Trials have been described as a "panic"
(Godbeer, 2005, 7). Here, hysteria justified stifling a challenge
to sexual norms which might have established more egalitarian social relations (Federici, 2004, 22). As social mores shifted
toward increased social autonomy, fears of insurrection followed (Heale, 1990). Richard Hofstadter (1964) has come to
describe this mode of thinking as the "paranoid style" of US
political thought. "Whatever combination of guilt, sexuality,
aggression, or other impulses produce the counter-subversive
mindset, Americans have never suffered from a shortage of
scapegoated aliens," Ellen Schrecker (1998) writes. In addition
to the witches, the list of 'others' - native Americans, slaves,
Catholics, immigrants - who represented a threat - is not short.
By the 2 0 th century, communists, anarchists, queers, suffragettes, and welfare queens followed in this long line of, "substitute others" (p. 47). The association between these "substitute
other[s]" feeds a cultural xenophobia in any number of policy
debates. As Gayle Rubin notes, "Popular sexual ideology is
a noxious stew made up of ideas of sexual sin, concepts of
psychological inferiority, anti-communism, mob hysteria, accusations of witchcraft, and xenophobia" (1984/1997, p. 108).
This logic mirrors much of the rise and fall in history the U.S.
welfare state (Reisch and Andrews, 2003).
Panic discourse extended well into the formation of the
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New Deal. The notion that the New Deal was a plan to undermine free-market capitalism was a frequent conspiracy theory
of the 1930s. Many contended that the U.S. government was
being taken over by communists (Hofstadter, 1964, p. 31). This
anxiety about collectivist thought often undermines efforts
at broad social programs (Skocpol, 1995). It also resulted in a
widespread hostility toward the growing welfare state and the
people it employed. More workers lost their jobs in the federal
government for being alleged "sex perverts" than "communists" during the peak McCarthy years of the 1950s (D'Emilio,
1983). Despite the limited numbers of communists located,
the link between sexual nonconformity and government established a framework for forty years of sex panics over the
welfare state.
Just as the Red Scare was receding, a new and profoundly
influential anti-welfare discourse emerged. Newspapers in
June 1961 raised an alarm over relief services for "migrant
relief cheats" in Newburgh, New York (Abramovitz 1996, p.
318-28; Levenstein, 2000). Much of the anxiety unfolded with
City Manager Joseph Mitchell's new policy of limits on recipients for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC, the predecessor
to AFDC). Here, ADC was thought to subsidize promiscuity among black women who had migrated north. From 1950
to 1960, the African American population of Newburgh rose
151 percent, while the white population declined 14 percent.
Many hailed Mitchell's efforts to impose work requirements,
preventing licentious women from "milking unwed mother
aid." Since the 1930's, ADC had been understood as a pension
for widows. With the Newburgh panic, views of this program
were transformed through a media frenzy, as news stories
highlighted the looming menace of "lazy welfare cheats"
who migrated to Northern cities. In fact, only 2.9 percent of
Newburgh's population received welfare services, and white
people constituted a majority of the recipients (Levenstein,
2000).
Panics often emerge to justify policies aimed at controlling
outsider groups, in this case those receiving public aid in a
period of rapid economic and demographic flux. As the backlash takes hold, panics conflate race, sex, and ideological biases
into a moralistic frame, as talk of traditional "values" conceals
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social bias. The symbolic linkage between women on public
assistance and "promiscuity" in Newburgh built on age-old
conceptions of social purity. Racism is, after all, said to find its
fait accompli in the sexualization of otherness (Calvin, 1988, p.
xii-xiii; Kushnick, 1999; Nagel, 2003).
Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater was particularly impressed with Mitchell's work in Newburgh. Goldwater sent
the city manager a letter stating he thought the cuts to services were as "refreshing as breathing the clean air of my native
Arizona." The Senator added that he would "like to see every
city in the country adapt the plan" (Levenstein, 2000). In many
ways, the Newburgh welfare panic anticipated the Goldwater/
Nixon southern strategy that followed (Kushnick, 1999).
By far, the most influential welfare panic began with the
southern strategy race, crime discourse advanced by Goldwater.
Crime first became a national issue during the presidential
campaign of Republican candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964.
While he "sounded the alarm" about "crime in the streets,"
initially few Americans were concerned about the issue. Public
opinion polls at the time cited war, civil rights, poverty, and
unemployment as more important issues to most voters. Still
Goldwater's language about the danger to mothers and children presented by escalating crime rates and the threats of
desegregation represented the makings of a classic sex/moral
panic (Chambliss, 1995).
Although the strategy did not work in 1964, a coalition
of conservative legislators, the crime control industry, and
media continued to push the issue. By 1968, years of race riots
offered fertile ground for a political shift. This time, the anticrime strategy proved successful. Faced with a shift in social
foundations, the right wing succeeded in generating a moral
panic over race, crime, and declining public order. It did so by
sustaining public anxiety over threats from specific population
groups, including youth, people of color, and welfare recipients (Hall, 1978; Victor, 1998: 547). By linking crime and race,
the conservative coalition justified an ongoing expansion of
federal authority in the arena of crime control under the guise
of a War on Drugs. Along the road, they created a new scapegoat - the War on Poverty and the welfare state. "People react
to fear, not love" a Machiavellian Nixon explained. "They
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don't teach you that in Sunday school, but its true," (quoted
in Glassner, 1999, p. xxviii). In the ensuing years, support
for public education and services dwindled while programs
aimed at control of those on public assistance gained support
(Chambliss, 1995; Davey, 1995; Harcourt, 2001).
The Goldwater, Nixon panic triggered a profound transformation in U.S. policy priorities. In the years after 1968 and
more intensely after 1972, discourses of fear helped divert attention away from real problems, which if solved could shift
power arrangements away from the elites (Hall, 1978). Faced
with an oil embargo, cheap foreign goods and labor, and business downturn, a well-connected elite comprised of a triumvirate of America's upper social classes, corporate communities,
and policy formation organizations lobbied to restrict policies
that created jobs for the unemployed, made health and welfare
policies more generous, helped employees gain workplace
rights and protections, and helped workers organize. Social and
economic policies which redistributed income upward, cheapened the cost of labor, shrunk social programs, weakened progressive social movements, and limited the role of the federal
government. This panic discourse served as a key ingredient of
the New Rights' efforts to turn back the progress of the Labor,
Civil Rights, and Women's Movements (Abramovitz, 2000, p.
17). It helped advance an agenda supporting tighten concentrations of wealth, social inequality, and increased mechanisms
of social control (Domhoff, 1998). Following 1968, neo-liberal
political ideology continued to support privatization, while
watering down of the state's ability to address social needs.
Wide-spread social anxiety and alienation only followed as
discord between community, work, and family become widespread. As the viscous cycle continued, the Right offered solutions to this anxiety which amounted to still further technologies of control requiring additional sacrifice of social liberties
(Knight 2003). Fear remained a piece of new right political
advocacy.
By the 1980s, these policies became a fait accompli. Panic
took countless forms. While some panics inspired grassroots
responses, others further undid the work of progressive social
movements. Panics over an "underclass" in poverty-ridden
urban areas involving crime, crack, and teenage pregnancy
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were used to scale back social programs for the poor (Goodwin
and Jasper, 2003, p. 259). These panic discourses over family,
race, poverty, and sexuality anticipated the call to do away
with AFDC itself in 1996.
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush both exalted a new
political philosophy of "family values," while Attorney General
Edwin Meese hammered away about the dangers of predation
against children. After 1977, preoccupation with normal sexuality and the safety of children led to an unending discourse
on their seduction. One example was the Meese Commission's
use of child seduction hysteria. Here, the message became that
women should get their kids out of nurseries and daycare facilities. The best way to do this was to leave work to stay home
with the kids. Anti-censorship feminists succeeded in pointing
out that child sex panic was employed to turn back the advances of the women's movement, justifying keeping women
out of the labor force (Michelson 1996, p. 8-10).
The panic did not end with Meese. By the mid 1980s, the
persistent poverty of U.S. inner cities could be viewed as one of
the primary concerns of end of the 20th century. In attempting
to explain the ongoing and deeply ingrained poverty among
African Americans, many began to reconsider the role of the
1935 Social Security Act, which laid a foundation for the U.S.
welfare state. At its most controversial, Social Security was
credited with incorporating "racial and gender assumptions
that led millions of women to become dependent on the most
stigmatized and limited forms of public aid" (Luker, 1996, p.
52). "What some writers are calling 'the coming welfare wars'
will be a largely wars about, even against, women," noted
Nancy Fraser (1989, p. 144).
These "welfare wars" would include inquiry into the most
intimate aspects of women's lives as the autonomy of the
women on public assistance became contested terrain. From
inquiries into their sexual lives (Gordarn, 2001), to crusades
against reproductive choice (Hunter, 1985), to renewed calls
for a "man in the house", to increased funding for abstinenceonly sex education programs (Bader, 2002), panic discourses
would take countless forms. Yet, they all involved calls for
control of "deviant sexual behavior" of low-income women
(Handler, 1972, p. 34-5).
A primary arena of this struggle involved debate about
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teenage pregnancy. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, teen
pregnancy, child-rearing, and the sex lives of those on public
assistance became the primary subjects of the "welfare wars."
Reports suggested that nearly a million teenagers were becoming pregnant each year, at profound costs to both themselves
and the public welfare rolls (Christensen and Rose, 1996). For
many, welfare programs seemed to encourage "irresponsible"
sexuality; thus it came to be viewed as a "dysfunctional" government program (Miller and Markle, 2002).
A nationwide debate over the urban "underclass" ensued.
While many of the themes of this debate can be traced back
to the 1 9 th century, the prime mover of the contemporary
discussion was Charles Murray. With his 1984 work, Losing
Ground, the "underclass" poor, particularly "immoral" single
mothers and their illegitimate kids, were depicted as a threat
to social norms. For Murray, social problems related to the
poor stemmed from a decline in moral values, permissiveness
and access to welfare benefits. He called a moral revitalization
and stigmatization of social outsiders and welfare beneficiaries (Thompson, 1998: 89-90). Others would suggest that if advocates such as Murray really cared about the welfare of children, they would have to "move beyond the moral panic and
denial that so often distort the discussion" (Christensen and
Rose, 1996).
"There is a welfare queen who has three different names,"
Reagan famously bemoaned, building on the Goldwater and
Nixon panics over the validity of public welfare. This use
of labels thus transformed poor women from citizens into
"welfare mothers." Murray's work was an inspiration for
Reagan, providing cover for his reversal of tax policy from
progressive to regressive favoritism of the affluent. By labeling
those who used these services as lazy and dishonest, Reagan
delegitimized the validity the welfare state itself (Kushnick,
1999). While social welfare advocates fought for social mobility for the poor, Reagan advanced panic after panic which
supported policies supporting social control and mandatory
reproduction (Abramovitz, 2000, p.92-3,36-7).
Perhaps the most paradigmatic episode to be addressed
in this essay involves the panics which paved the way for the
passage of 'welfare reform' in 1996. Ruth Sidell suggests that
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in the wake of the Cold War, welfare recipients filled a distinct void in U.S. politics (1998) becoming one of a long list of
convenient "others" (Heale, 1990). Like the ungodly communists before them, welfare recipients offered a convenient distraction. As House Republicans debated welfare reform in 1995,
they actually referred to women on welfare as wild animals,
"breeding mules," and "monkeys" (Kushnick, 1999: 160). By
dehumanizing welfare beneficiaries as "others," it became all
that much easier to claim they were undeserving (Miller and
Markle, 2002). "A society does not simply discover its others,"
Ruth Sidell explains, "it fabricates them" (1998, P. 24).
Throughout these years, panic discourses conflated permissiveness, sex, crime and race with public assistance and the unworthy poor. This justified countless forms of subtle and notso-subtle control of women's lives (Luker, 1996). This pattern
reached an apex in 1996. As a result, much of the substance of
the 1996 law aimed to regulate female sexuality. Among other
things, the law tied financial aid to a woman's age, marital
status, and the number of children she had on public assistance. It furthered a family ethic by stigmatizing single motherhood, encouraging the formation of two-parent families, and
calling for a family cap. Here, it rewarded states that reduced
non-marital births and abortions while earmarking money to
states that promoted ineffective abstinence-only sex education
programs (Flanders, 1998). This policy continued with Bush's
push to divert welfare funds from poverty reduction to marriage promotion (Badar, 2002).
A core component of the dividing process of the mid-1990s
was an effort by municipalities across the country to shut
down public spaces where social outsiders build community
around non-monogamy (Dangerous Bedfellows, 1996). In
1997, a group argued that the local and national manifestations
of these trends, including New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani's
Quality of Life crusade, fit a distinctively political schema:
This is not the first time that officials have launched
repressive measures against sex in the name of public
good. Since the nineteenth century, it has been a
recurrent pattern: Public morals and health have been
invoked; scapegoats have been found in homosexuals,
sex workers and others who are unlikely to fight
back; and a fantasy of purity is held up as the norm.
Historians have come to call this pattern a "sex panic"
(Crimp et al, 1998).

Sex Panic and the Welfare State

167

The group, dubbed SexPanic!, recognized a Temperanceera logic in the crusade to close adult businesses, curtail welfare
provisions, and sanitize urban space (Wagner, 1997a).
The Quality of Life crusade was chock-full of contradictions. While Giuliani (1998) called for work - rather than
welfare - to become the center of life for all New Yorkers, the
cornerstone of the crusade called for zoning changes that
would close adult businesses that he found distasteful. Yet,
by pushing to shut down businesses where many women and
men made their living, the mayor simultaneously contributed
to unemployment in New York City (Warner, 1999). "This is an
economic issue. I am really frightened. I am really angry, not
just for myself but for the thousands and thousands of women
who are going to be unemployed and out of work," Cindra
Feuer, one of the organizers against the proposed zoning
changes who also worked in an adult business, explained in a
1998 radio interview. "And as we all know, unemployment is
really high; its above the national average in our city. Jobs are
not easy to come by." Like many others, Feuer, whose place of
work was shut down, faced an uncertain future
SexPanic! recognized that adult entertainers, men who
have sex in public, and those with children on welfare are attacked because of a similar sex-phobia. Douglas Crimp specifically referred to these patterns of state-sanctioned control of
sexual choice:
Not so long ago it was illegal and considered unnatural
for people of different races to have sex with each
other. Our country has a long and ignominious history
of fearing and punishing nonwhite people for their
sexuality and particularly having sex with white people.
The history of lynching black men is largely a history of
murdering them for accusations that they desired white
women. Today, poor women of color are forced to cede
reproductive choices to qualify for welfare benefits.
Men of color are routinely treated more harshly when
entrapped and arrested on charges of public lewdness
(1997, p. 12).
Such debates about public sexual culture involve core themes
of public-sphere theory originated by Jiirgen Habermas
(1962/2000) and Nancy Frazier (1989). Habermas contends
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that only those with capital can participate in the formal confines of the public sphere and its social privileges. Those with
capital enjoy social privileges, including privacy from the
public glare. Those who do not own or maintain control of their
living spaces - and thus must have sex in "public" - are considered socially deviant and relegated to outsider status (Rubin,
1984/1997). Wagner (1997B) notes that the deviant behavior of
poor people is harder to conceal because low-income people
- including the homeless, queer youth, and people on welfare
- have fewer resources to enable them hide their activities from
public view, subjecting them to increasingly aggressive "zero
tolerance" policing of public space (Dangerous Bedfellows,
1996; Harcourt, 2001).
While the era of big government for social programs ended
in 1994, big government for policing has expanded. While
rates of crime decreased from 1975 to 1995 "a moral panic
about crime and lawlessness [was] in full swing throughout the
country" (Platt, 1995). And controls followed with the passage
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
and the Patriot Act of 2001. Thus, over the final decades of the
2 0 th century, the policy landscape in the U.S. shifted from an
emphasis on public welfare toward crime control (Chambliss,
1995; Davey, 1995). Today, one of the fastest growing public
spaces is prisons (Kolodner, 2006; Zukin 1995).
Race, crime, and sexual panics function in the same fashion.
They are part of a frenzied drive to cultivate support for polities
favoring a better business climate for economic polices poised
to privatize, control, and profit from everything from water to
public space to social welfare services (Duggan, 2003).
As of today, welfare services are diminished, while policing
and military expenditures only grow. In 1964, Herbert Marcuse
alluded to a merging of mass media, corporate power, and the
blurring of social welfare programs into ever-greater mechanisms of social control. "The society of total mobilization, which
takes shape in the most advanced areas of industrial civilization, combines in productive union the features of the Welfare
State and the Warfare State" (p. 19). He continues, "The main
trends are familiar: concentration of the national economy on
the needs of big corporations, with the government as a stimulating, supporting, and sometimes even controlling force,"
(p. 19). Here media, public opinion, and market pressure
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creative a coercive context to further erode line between the
welfare and warfare state. Services fade; neo-liberal policies
advance and the welfare state recedes (Duggan, 2003). The
panics serve as the distractions to the process. When fear rises,
policing follows. Yesterday, they were welfare queens. Today,
they are immigrants and Arabs. The beat goes on.
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